出版日期：2009-03-01 00:00:00

著者：林志娟; Lin, Jyh-Jiuan; Chang, Ching-hui; 林志鴻; Lin, Jyh-horng

單位：淡江大學國際貿易學系

出版者：World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS)

著錄名稱、卷期、頁數：WSEAS Transactions on Mathematics 8(3), pp.117-126

摘要：Will banks be willing to sell their toxic loans with the help of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)? The answer is yes as long as bids are high enough to tempt banks to deal. With the TARP's help, an increase in the toxic loans sold to the government increases the bank's margin and decreases the bank's default probability in equity return when the bank encounters greater risk. This paper concludes that setting up the TARP for the 'bad bank' solution may be a good move for retail banking, resulting in high margin and low default risk when its target banks are willing sellers.

關鍵字：default risk; interest margin; toxic loans; troubled asset relief program

語言：en

ISSN：1109-2769

期刊性質：國外

收錄於：EI